Reorienting programme budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA) towards disinvestment by Duncan Mortimer
DEBATE Open Access
Reorienting programme budgeting and marginal
analysis (PBMA) towards disinvestment
Duncan Mortimer
Abstract
Background: Remarkable progress has been made over the past 40 years in developing rational, evidence-based
mechanisms for the allocation of health resources. Much of this progress has centred on mechanisms for
commissioning new medical devices and pharmaceuticals. The attention of fund-managers and policy-makers is
only now turning towards development of mechanisms for decommissioning, disinvesting or redeploying
resources from currently funded interventions. While Programme Budgeting and Marginal Analysis would seem
well-suited to this purpose, past applications include both successes and failures in achieving disinvestment and
resource release.
Discussion: Drawing on recent successes/failures in achieving disinvestment and resource release via PBMA, this
paper identifies four barriers/enablers to disinvestment via PBMA: (i) specification of the budget constraint, (ii)
scope of the programme budget, (iii) composition and role of the advisory group, and (iv) incentives for/against
contributing to a ‘shift list’ of options for disinvestment and resource release. A number of modifications to the
PBMA process are then proposed with the aim of reorienting PBMA towards disinvestment.
Summary: The reoriented model is differentiated by four features: (i) hard budget constraint with budgetary
pressure; (ii) programme budgets with broad scope but specific investment proposals linked to disinvestment
proposals with similar input requirements; (iii) advisory/working groups that include equal representation of
sectional interests plus additional members with responsibility for advocating in favour of disinvestment, (iv) ‘shift
lists’ populated and developed prior to ‘wish lists’ and investment proposals linked to disinvestment proposals
within a relatively narrow budget area. While the argument and evidence presented here suggest that the
reoriented model will facilitate disinvestment and resource release, this remains an empirical question. Likewise,
further research will be required to determine whether or not the re-oriented model sacrifices feasibility and
acceptability to obtain its hypothesised greater emphasis on disinvestment.
Background
Over the past 40 years, academics, evaluators and pol-
icy-makers have made quite remarkable progress in the
development and application of rational, evidence-based
mechanisms for the allocation of health resources.
While much of this progress has centred on mechan-
isms for commissioning new medical devices and phar-
maceuticals, attention is increasingly turning towards
development of mechanisms for decommissioning, disin-
vesting or redeploying resources from currently funded
interventions. At the macro level, England’s House of
Commons Health Committee has recommended that
NICE give greater emphasis to identifying interventions
that offer poor value for money and that might therefore
be suitable candidates for disinvestment [1-3]. Australia’s
Medicare Benefits (MBS) Quality Framework [4] recently
implemented a new process for review of existing MBS
items “with the aim of identifying and evaluating MBS
services which are potentially unsafe, ineffective, or inap-
propriately used” where delisting or amendment of the
item or fee might be appropriate. Similar concerns have
been recognised in technology assessment guidelines and
policy statements by regional health authorities and
health technology assessment agencies in Spain, by the
Scottish Health Technologies Group, and by the Ontario
Health Technology Advisory Committee [5]. Several
national and regional agencies have taken the further
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step of developing and implementing tools for identifying
and prioritising options for disinvestment [4-9]. At the
micro level, providers and local fund-holders facing
increasingly modest year-on-year growth in their budgets
are piloting a range of mechanisms that might facilitate
cost containment and/or redeployment of resources from
currently funded interventions [9-12]. Programme Bud-
geting and Marginal Analysis or PBMA [13] has been
suggested as one such mechanism for achieving disin-
vestment [12,14].
Since the first health sector application of PBMA in the
early 1970s, the method has been applied in regional
health services, hospital networks, individual hospitals and
hospital units [13,15]. For those unfamiliar with PBMA,
explanations of the underlying principles and step by step
accounts of the process are available elsewhere [16,17].
Where such exercises have failed to translate ‘wish lists’
into action; typically, this is a consequence of a failure to
release resources from elsewhere in the programme bud-
get. The broader difficulties of disinvestment have been
previously described and will not be revisited here [18,19].
Rather, the present paper identifies a number of features
of PBMA that may have hampered disinvestment and
resource release activities in previous applications. It is
then argued that PBMA can provide a more reliable and
efficient mechanism for achieving disinvestment and
resource release if four features of the process can be
modified to reorient PBMA towards disinvestment.
Discussion
Disinvestment via PBMA?
While some proponents of the approach have claimed
that PBMA “necessarily links questions about invest-
ment and disinvestment of services” [20], this need not
be the case during periods of rapid growth in health
care expenditure. PBMA has much to offer in “maximis-
ing the benefit gained from an extra unit of resources”
[17] and - rightly or wrongly - the value of PBMA dur-
ing periods of rapid expenditure growth will turn pri-
marily on its success/failure in identifying and
prioritising new investments. Past applications of PBMA
conducted in environments of rapid expenditure growth
are therefore unlikely to assist in identifying features of
PBMA that may have hampered or facilitated disinvest-
ment and resource release. Likewise, we should not
expect instruction from applications that were primarily
concerned with prioritising between proposals for
expansion in service provision. The discussion presented
here instead focuses on recent applications of PBMA -
many conducted in an environment of comparative
budgetary discipline - where resource release or rede-
ployment was explicitly identified as an objective.
Several recent applications are distinguished by their
success in achieving significant resource release. For
example, Mitton et al [21] describe an application of
PBMA’s macro equivalent: Macro Marginal Analysis or
MMA, in a major regional health authority in Alberta,
Canada. In this application, efficiency gains (such as
shifts to generic drugs and higher patient:staff ratios)
and service reductions (including rationalisation of ser-
vice delivery to reduce duplication) agreed under
the MMA process delivered savings of approximately
45 million Canadian dollars. Mitton et al [21] concluded
that this exercise served to dispel the prevailing myth
that significant resource release is not achievable via
PBMA-like approaches and further commented that:
“Although it is difficult to change clinical practices,
particularly noting how entrenched health care
services can become, both efficiency and service
reductions can result if decision-makers have a
genuine interest in improving the health of the
population” [21].
While genuine interest in pursuing social or organisa-
tional objectives (such as improving population health)
rather than personal objectives (such as expanding
empires or defending turf) can dictate the success or
failure of the PBMA process, it is worth noting that
organisational objectives vary depending upon profit/
non-profit status and public/private ownership and that
social objectives are not limited to population health
[22]. Even where the organisational and social objectives
have a single-minded regard for population health, other
factors have an important part to play in facilitating dis-
investment and resource release.
The available evidence also suggests that clinically
meaningful resource release is achievable via PBMA-like
approaches in micro applications. In applying PBMA to
contain surgical waitlists in Canmore General Hospital
[23], scenario analysis of adjustments to the surgical
program suggested that annual savings of 11,000
Canadian dollars could be obtained from improved
scheduling, fewer call-backs and shorter days ($1000/yr
reduction in overtime pay) and from substitution to
cheaper inputs ($5000/yr savings from cheaper steriliza-
tion methods in endoscopy plus a $5000/yr reduction in
associated maintenance costs). After expansion of the
surgical program to include 17 additional days of minor
surgery per year (+$8925/yr), implementation of panel
recommendations was expected to yield a small net
resource release ($2075/yr).
While the Canmore and Calgary exercises provide some
cause for optimism, PBMA has not always been so suc-
cessful in achieving disinvestment and resource release. In
some cases, PBMA working/advisory groups have encoun-
tered difficulties in populating a ‘shift list’ with options for
disinvestment. For example, the advisory/working group
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in the Newcastle upon Tyne PCT Child and Adolescent
Mental Health Services (CAMHS) exercise failed to iden-
tify a single service that might be decommissioned to free
up resources for reinvestment “and therefore had to rely
on future investment to fund priorities” [14]. In other
cases, difficulties have arisen in progressing beyond the
identification of options for disinvestment to development
of business cases. After piloting PBMA in Hull PCT’s dia-
betes programme, Baughan and Ferguson [26] observed
that “identifying options for service change was relatively
easy, however identifying and working up options for
resource release was more challenging”. Whereas fifteen of
the identified options for service change in the Hull exer-
cise either required additional resources or were initially
claimed to be budget neutral, just two options were identi-
fied that had the potential to deliver resource release
(changing insulin prescribing practice, and reassessing use
of blood test strips) neither of which were developed into
business cases. The four options that were developed into
business cases were each presented as budget neutral.
While implementation of budget neutral service change is
not dependent on resource release from elsewhere in the
programme budget, “there were cost implications... if only
opportunity costs, not recognised when the business cases
had been written” [26]. The exercise also identified options
of ‘significant marginal benefit’ (not developed into busi-
ness cases) that were dependent on resource release. Reor-
ienting PBMA to place greater emphasis on identifying
and developing options for disinvestment and resource
release might - in this case - have provided a fall back in
the event that claims of budget neutrality were deemed
unrealistic and would have allowed greater flexibility to
pursue other investments of ‘significant marginal benefit’.
Even where the hurdles of identification and develop-
ment of options for disinvestment have been cleared,
PBMA working/advisory groups in some applications
have met resistance in progressing to implementation.
In applying PBMA to prioritise Norfolk Primary Care
Trust’s spending on mental health services [12,24], the
advisory panel identified 18 disinvestment options
(revised down to nine); “sufficient... to fund all the
options for service change that required investment”
[12]. Despite the ‘sufficiency’ of resource release poten-
tially available from identified disinvestment options,
participants in the Norfolk pilot were uncertain that any
such options would actually be implemented. In another
such example, Bohmer et al [25] applied PBMA to
prioritise investments and disinvestments from respira-
tory diseases expenditure in New Zealand’s Southern
(SRHA) and Midland (MRHA) health regions. Options
for investment and disinvestment were identified and
prioritised in both regions but neither region implemen-
ted recommendations for disinvestment. The MRHA,
for example, implemented several investments after
allocating additional funds to the respiratory diseases
program but made no plans for disinvestment. Interest-
ingly, Bohmer et al reported that one of the RHAs felt
‘unable to disinvest’ and noted “the difficulties encoun-
tered by purchasers in making disinvestments”.
Barriers to disinvestment
While “PBMA as a local commissioning tool was seen by
those involved as a success” (emphasis added) in many
past applications [26], success in decommissioning, dis-
investing or redeploying resources has sometimes pro-
ven difficult to achieve. In this section, examples are
taken from past the applications - including those
described above - to illustrate four barriers to disinvest-
ment and resource release: specification of the budget
constraint, scope of the programme budget, composition
and role of the advisory group, and incentives for/
against contributing to a ‘shift list’ of options for disin-
vestment and resource release.
Budgetary pressure
Past applications have demonstrated that PBMA fails to
effectively link questions about investment and disin-
vestment of services when the budget constraint is
poorly specified and/or treated as a decision variable. In
the Newcastle CAMHS application, the budget con-
straint was poorly specified and, after receiving clarifica-
tion regarding the availability of extra funds, was then
treated as a decision variable. Initially, the CAMHS
application proceeded as if:
“...new service developments could only be achieved
through decommissioning current services to fund
reinvestment in new services, or through no cost
whole system redesign. ...as the exercise progressed,
service reviews conducted at other levels of CAMHS
freed up potential resources for investment” [14].
When the time came to prioritise new service devel-
opments, resources earmarked for redeployment to
CAMHS were ‘no longer available’ due to ‘political fac-
tors’. Participants in the CAMHS application were
therefore, at a crucial stage of the PBMA process, under
the impression that service developments would be fea-
sible irrespective of the magnitude of resource release
achieved via the PBMA process. It is not surprising then
that, when disinvestment proposals were requested,
‘none were forthcoming’. After it became clear that
additional monies would not immediately be available to
fund new service developments, there remained hope
that “up our sleeves we could have funded some things
(Advisory Panel member 1)” [14].
In other applications, such hopes have proven to be
well-founded; with the strategy of first prioritising options
for commissioning and then lobbying for relaxation of the
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budget constraint being employed with some success. For
example, in the MRHA exercise described by Bohmer et al
[25], one of the outcomes of the process was a relaxation
of the budget constraint. Subsequent to prioritising
options for service change, an internal working group was
formed to consider the feasibility of investment and disin-
vestment proposals given constraints. It may be that
- faced with the difficult task of implementing disinvest-
ments - the MRHA opted for the path of least resistance.
In any event, additional monies for new investments were
eventually forthcoming “meaning that no disinvestment
needed to occur” [25].
If the incentive to pursue disinvestments is weakened
where the budget constraint is poorly specified and/or
treated as a decision variable, past experience suggests
that the converse is also true. While the pressure to
contain surgical waitlists in the Canmore application
made identification of new investments easy (additional
days of surgery) and motivated population of ‘shift lists’,
the direct link between investments and disinvestments
only became apparent after running up against the bud-
get constraint. Specifically, the primary recommendation
of an additional 38 days of major surgery and 12 days of
minor surgery could not be implemented given existing
resources and feasible resource releases. When the panel
recognised this constraint, they were able to match
existing resources and feasible resource releases against
a much more modest expansion of the surgical pro-
gramme [23].
Past experience has also demonstrated that - during
periods of rapid expenditure growth - commissioning
new investments remains feasible independent of any
disinvestment and resource release from existing services.
Applications that have achieved significant resource
release have typically done so under significant budget-
ary pressure (budget cuts/deficits of known magnitude)
or under significant pressure on limited resources (wait-
ing lists exceeding targets). For example, the budget for
mental health services in the Norfolk PCT was cut by
£2 million in the year of the PBMA pilot and faced a
further cut of 8% in the year following such that “sub-
stantial disinvestments had to be identified to satisfy the
planned budget cuts before any investments could be
considered” [12]. While strong incentives to identify
options for disinvestment and resource release were
built into the PBMA process in this application (as dis-
cussed below), such incentives may not have been put
in place in the absence of significant budgetary pressure.
In the Alberta MMA application, savings of some 42
million Canadian dollars were required to address the
budget deficit. Mitton et al [21] suggest that “...if there
was no deficit, a large amount of resources would have
been available for genuine re-allocation to service growth
areas”. Alternatively, it may be that the substantial deficit
motivated disinvestments and that participants might not
have been so forthcoming with options for disinvestment
in the absence of significant budgetary pressure. Given
the small share of released resources allocated to new
investments, it seems likely that the quite remarkable
success of the Alberta application in achieving resource
release was primarily attributable to significant budgetary
pressure - rather than to “a genuine interest in improving
the health of the population” [21].
Scope
Past experience suggests that the link between invest-
ments and disinvestments in the PBMA process may be
weakened by the failure to specify a hard budget con-
straint. Failure to adequately specify the scope of the
programme and the PBMA exercise can have a similar
impact. When faced with a hard budget constraint,
there is an incentive to shift costs by proposing service
expansions for which other programme budgets would
foot the bill or attempt to identify savings in other pro-
grammes with the aim of relaxing the budget constraint.
While encouraging attempts at identifying potential sav-
ings in other programmes may actually increase the
emphasis given to disinvestment and resource release in
the PBMA process, implementation of disinvestments
proposed in other areas is likely to prove challenging. In
Canmore, for example, “some reasonable releases were
targeted outside the surgery budget” but when it came
time to prioritise options for investment and disinvest-
ment “...panel members did not feel they had the
authority to reallocate resources from other programs”
[23]. Others have noted similar barriers to disinvestment
wherein “decrements were considered impractical in
hindsight, as they ...would also have implications for a
wide range of other agencies” [27].
Past experience also suggests that simply discontinu-
ing or restricting the range of services to be provided
within a programme does not guarantee that resources
will be available for redeployment to new investments.
These broader difficulties of realising the savings from
disinvestment are well-understood by health service
administrators; to the extent that some have argued that
“anything we do costs money, even if it looks like it
should save some. If you try to stop people doing some-
thing that does not work they will go and do something
more expensive” [28]. While the extent of such pro-
blems will depend upon the structures and processes
that the provider or fund-holder has in place with
respect to clinical governance, purchasing, and industrial
relations; resource release may be more achievable when
resources are redeployed in quite a direct manner from
areas of service contraction to areas of service expan-
sion. Or, as Twaddle and Walker [28] put it, “changes
will be easier to implement if they involve the same
staff, etc switching from one task to another”. Where
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the programme budget spans a wide range of health ser-
vices, delivered in different settings and serving different
patient populations, direct redeployment of resources
may be difficult to achieve and the breadth of the pro-
gramme budget may itself prove a barrier to
disinvestment.
Advisory group
PBMA advisory/working groups typically select mem-
bers to represent stakeholder groups and to access spe-
cialist expertise necessary for the PBMA process.
Advisory groups in the MHRA and SHRA applications
[25], for example, included representatives of regions,
consumer groups, and distinct patient populations
(Maori); as well as respiratory physicians (approximately
one-third of members), surgeons, general practitioners,
oncologists, nursing staff, physiotherapists, hospital
managers, and academics. Typically, some members (e.g.
medical and surgical specialists; hospital managers) are
principally selected for their expertise (e.g. understand-
ing of treatment pathways and patient populations for
relevant disease-areas; understanding of hospital costing
systems and budgeting) rather than to represent the
interests of stakeholders. However, past experience sug-
gests that some ‘expert’ members find it difficult to set
aside sectional interests:
“Individual physicians are often more concerned with
their specific area and set of patients than the overall
state of health in a particular region. ...if everyone puts
their head down and does not want to give up any ser-
vices for the disinvestment list, health care budgets will
continue to grow as they always have” [21].
When the time comes to develop a ‘wish list’ of new
programmes and programme expansions, there is an
obvious temptation for members of working/advisory
groups to ‘expand empires’ by proposing new invest-
ments within their own budget area. The incentive for
members to contribute to a ‘shift list’ is much less clear-
cut; and would require members to either advocate in
favour of disinvestments from their own budget (and
perhaps against their own personal or professional inter-
ests), or target disinvestments in other areas within the
programme budget (against the interests of colleagues).
This may explain why ‘shift lists’ are often sparsely
populated (or, at least, more sparsely populated than
‘wish lists’).
Even where ‘shift lists’ have been populated with some
success, the involvement of the advisory group at key
stages of the PBMA process permits ample opportunity
for sectional interests to defend their turf. As Elshaug
and colleagues[6] put it, “some stakeholders may prefer
that the status quo be maintained” (p217). Stakeholders
might seek to influence selection and weighting of benefit
attributes so as to cast activities slated for disinvestment
in the best possible light. Likewise, stakeholders could
influence the selection and weighting of evidence regard-
ing costs and effects so as to sure-up the position of
options for disinvestment (e.g. broadening inclusion cri-
teria, equal weighting for low- and high-level evidence).
Even if the ranking of an activity suggests that it is pro-
viding no additional benefit at a substantial additional
cost, stakeholders have a further opportunity to advocate
for the preservation of the activity prior to making any
final recommendations for disinvestment.
While most would advocate on behalf of one’s patients
and colleagues given the opportunity, the process
employed in some past applications may have amplified
the natural tendency to do so. In the MHRA and SHRA,
for example, advisory group members were invited to
become spokespeople for expansion: i.e. “advocates for
investment and against disinvestment” [25]. While
Bohmer et al [25] argued that this “worked well and
encouraged debate among participants”, they also recog-
nised that the failure to also nominate spokespeople for
contraction: i.e. advocates against investment and for
disinvestment, may have further “biased the process
against disinvestment”.
Incentives
Others have noted the weak incentive for disinvestment
under the budgetary processes that operate in some health
services. Mitton et al [21] characterise the culture of health
care as “one of rewarding overspending, whereby indivi-
dual programs get budgeted what was spent, instead of
being rewarded for staying within budget”. When coupled
with the risk that released resources will be reclaimed by
fund-holders as an efficiency or productivity dividend
(rather than reallocated to fund investment options within
the programme budget), it is not surprising that advisory/
working groups would first seek an increase in their bud-
get allocation or to shift costs to other programmes. For
example, encouraged by the receipt of transfers from
other programmes to fund deficits in previous periods, the
Canmore surgical programme explored the possibility of
funding service expansions using resources released from
community services and long-term care [23]. While “bene-
fits to the community from such services were deemed to
be too great” to justify their disinvestment in this case, the
receipt of transfers in previous periods suggest that such
strategies might sometimes be effective in avoiding disin-
vestment and reallocation from within the programme
budget.
Reorienting PBMA towards disinvestment
Budgetary pressure
It does seem clear from past applications that the link
between investment and disinvestment is much more
direct when claw-back is required to control deficits or
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where health care expenditure growth has stagnated or
reached steady state. PBMA asks the question: “is it pos-
sible to invest in some items on the ‘wish list’ by disin-
vesting some from the (shift) list?” [14], but only if new
investments cannot first be funded out of expansions in
the programme budget. It also seems clear that, if parti-
cipants believe that additional funding can always be
found from somewhere (such that planned budget cuts
are not a true reflection of the likely reduction in avail-
able resources), the imperative to engage in the difficult
task of disinvestment and resource release will remain
weak. In such circumstances, there is a risk that PBMA
will be viewed primarily as a tool for identification and
prioritisation of new investments. Or, as Mitton and
Donaldson [16] put it:
“...obtaining resource releases can be difficult, parti-
cularly when incentives for change such as fiscal
pressure, are not present. In fact, this alone can be
the reason why PBMA never really bites in some
organizations”.
In the past, some health service managers have been
required to deliver year-on-year productivity or effi-
ciency dividends; with fund-holders applying budgetary
pressure in an attempt to move inefficient providers
towards best-practice. At least two problems arise with
this strategy in an environment of rapid expenditure
growth. First, year-on-year budget cuts may very quickly
have the effect of reducing quality and/or service levels
to the point where maximisation of total patient benefit
subject to total health expenditure would entail increas-
ing rather than decreasing the programme budget. Sec-
ond, fund-holders attempting to apply year-on-year
budget cuts in an environment of rapid expenditure
growth may encounter significant political fall-out. For
many providers and fund-holders, the current operating
environment is characterised by fiscal restraint rather
than expenditure growth; with budgetary pressure aris-
ing out of the current economic climate rather than by
artifice or design. Where disinvestment and resource
release is motivated by concerns for safety and quality
rather than cost containment, modifications could be
made to the PBMA process that would apply budgetary
pressure and provide an incentive for disinvestment
without actually reducing the budget. For example,
PBMA could be re-structured as a two-stage process
wherein an efficiency or productivity dividend must first
be delivered from disinvestment options before new
investments can be considered in the second stage.
In reorienting PBMA towards disinvestment, partici-
pants should be left in no doubt as to the magnitude of
the programme budget for the PBMA exercise; within
which they should identify and prioritise options for
investment and disinvestment. In particular, fund-
holders should make clear to participants that they
should not second-guess or adjust the specified budget
constraint under the assumption that ad hoc funding
will be found for high priority service expansions. Here,
the assumption is made that - for many providers and
fund-holders - fiscal restraint will be a feature of the
operating environment for some time to come. In envir-
onments of rapid expenditure growth, further modifica-
tions to the PBMA process may be required to exert
budgetary pressure and provide an incentive for disin-
vestment and reallocation from existing services in
order to maximise total patient benefit.
Scope
Past experience demonstrates that the link between
investments and disinvestments is weakened by failure
to specify hard boundaries around the programme bud-
get. If it is expected that resource may be taken from
the oncology budget to expand activities in the respira-
tory budget, then the scope of the programme budget
(and of the PBMA exercise) should be defined to cover
both the oncology and respiratory budgets. Broadening
the scope of the PBMA exercise is likely to make good
sense if changes in the oncology programme result in
either increased or decreased demands on respiratory
services. Recall, however, direct redeployment of
released resources might be difficult to achieve when
areas of service contraction demand a different level,
mix and quality of inputs than do areas of service
expansion. There may therefore be advantages to requir-
ing investment proposals to be linked to disinvestment
proposals within a relatively narrowly defined pro-
gramme budget (with relatively similar input require-
ments). In reorienting PBMA towards disinvestment, the
programme budget should be defined broadly enough to
include all feasible areas of service expansion and con-
traction but, within that programme budget, investment
proposals should be linked to disinvestment proposals
with relatively similar input requirements.
Advisory group
Past experience suggests that the composition and role of
PBMA advisory/working groups often creates a bias
against disinvestment. Advisory group members may be
reluctant to advocate in favour of disinvestments from
their own budget. Identifying resource releases from other
areas of the programme budget may be relatively easy in
the absence of stakeholders from those other programme
areas but charging clinicians in one speciality with respon-
sibility for formulation of a ‘shift list’ in another speciality
may prove counter-productive. The risk of retaliation in
future iterations may limit participation and the risk of
creating an adversarial relationship between specialities
may outweigh the benefits derived from redeployment of
released resources.
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Many service providers in the health sector are famil-
iar with the difficulties of negotiating conflicting sec-
tional interests. In one Victorian public hospital:
“Board members were not perceived to be responsible
as a group for managing the hospital, but rather
were viewed as relatively autonomous members,
appointed to represent sectional interests” [29].
Worse still, strong representation of physician inter-
ests and an absence of equally strong representation of
opposing interests led to physician dominance of the
board. Partly to address this issue, the Victorian Health
Commission Act (1980) and the Health Services Act
(1988) vested greater control over the appointment of
board members with the state health department and
restricted the size and composition of the hospital
boards. Similar changes in the composition of advisory/
working groups might be employed to diminish the
influence of sectional interests in the PBMA process. To
date, representation of stakeholders on PBMA advisory/
working groups has been considered more of a help
than a hindrance; largely because representation of phy-
sicians and hospital managers has also facilitated access
to specialist expertise necessary for the PBMA process
and because “implementation of changes to service
delivery becomes extremely difficult without acceptance
and ownership of those changes” [27]. In applications
conducted during periods of rapid expenditure growth
(and primarily concerned with commissioning), any bias
against disinvestment will receive low or zero weight in
the trade-off between costs and benefits of stakeholder
representation. However, quite a different trade-off
might operate in applications that place greater empha-
sis on achieving disinvestment and resource release.
The MHRA and SHRA application described by Boh-
mer et al [25] suggests one possible means of reorienting
PBMA towards disinvestment. If nominating “advocates
for investment and against disinvestment” in the MRHA
and SRHA applications introduced bias against disinvest-
ment [25], then nominating members with the specific
and sole purpose of advocating for disinvestment might
introduce a countervailing bias. In reorienting PBMA
towards disinvestment, sectional interests should be
equally represented on advisory/working groups to avoid
dominance of any one set of interests and any bias
against disinvestment arising from representation of sec-
tional interests should be countervailed by the appoint-
ment of advocates for disinvestment.
In addition to modifications to the composition of
advisory/working groups, there may be scope to modify
the role of the advisory/working group. Advisory/work-
ing group input will be crucial in describing the current
programme, in populating ‘wish lists’ and ‘shift lists’,
and to fill gaps in the available evidence. However, some
key steps in the PBMA process might more appropri-
ately be completed by other groups or individuals. ‘Wish
lists’ and ‘shift lists’ populated by the advisory group
could be supplemented by a nomination process [6,30]
or using one of the several recently developed tools for
identifying potential disinvestments [4-6,9]. Similarly, if
the end concern is to maximise the health or welfare of
the community (rather than to pursue organisational
objectives), then attributes of benefit and their relative
weights may be more directly accessed via citizens’
juries or deliberative polling than via physicians, hospital
managers or consumer representatives [31,32]. Likewise,
specialist centres in health technology assessment may
be better placed to identify and weight evidence regard-
ing costs and effects than are advisory/working groups
[8]. Once options for investment and disinvestment
have been scored by combining community weights
with evidence and expert opinion for each attribute, we
might further consider whether the input of PBMA
advisory/working groups is then more of a hindrance
than a help in revising final rankings and arriving at
recommendations. Modifications along such lines would
alter the very nature of PBMA; they risk seriously dama-
ging the feasibility and acceptability of an already diffi-
cult process and would leave fund-holders and
programme managers with the difficult task of imple-
menting recommendations that have been derived with
minimal consultation. For this reason, they have not
been incorporated into the reoriented model at this
stage.
Incentives
Past experience suggests that weak incentives in the
PBMA process for identifying, developing and imple-
menting disinvestment options may be hampering disin-
vestment and resource release. Past experience also
suggests several possible means of strengthening these
incentives. In the Norwich PCT application [12,24], for
example, nomination of an option for investment was
only accepted if a corresponding disinvestment was
nominated to the ‘shift list’. While this approach
resulted in a well-populated ‘shift list’, it did not provide
sufficient incentive to progress to development of busi-
ness cases for disinvestment options or onwards to
implementation.
The broader disinvestment literature suggests one pos-
sible approach in encouraging participants to take the
next step. To date, identification, prioritisation and
implementation of disinvestment options outside of
PBMA exercises has progressed largely independent of
commissioning [33]. Likewise, recently developed non-
PBMA processes for identification, prioritisation and
implementation of disinvestment options have typically
been conceived as operating independently or in parallel
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to commissioning processes [5,6]. For example, Ruano-
Raviña and colleagues argue that
“...just as there is a system for detection and assess-
ment of emerging technologies, there should be
another that would enable detection and assessment
of technologies which may have become obsolete” [5].
Similarly, Elshaug and colleagues [6] “...propose a
dedicated program...” for “...identifying and assessing
ineffective or non-cost-effective practices; reducing their
existing use” (p269, emphasis added). The task of identi-
fying, prioritising and implementing a ‘shift list’ would
presumably be the primary function of a dedicated dis-
investment programme and would not easily be oversha-
dowed or sidelined by commissioning activities
operating in parallel or independently. In contrast, the
development of ‘wish lists’ in PBMA typically precedes
development of ‘shift lists’ in a sequential process that
aims to “link questions about investment and disinvest-
ment of services” [20]. While de-coupling processes for
investment and disinvestment in PBMA would remove
one of its great assets, it may be possible to incorporate
some of the focus and attention given to disinvestment
activities in a dedicated program without weakening the
link between investments and disinvestments. In reor-
ienting PBMA towards disinvestment, the risk that dis-
investment becomes sidelined or overshadowed would
be much reduced by simply reversing the usual
sequence so that feasible options for disinvestment and
resource release are first identified and developed as
business cases before considering what else might be
achieved with those resources. That is to say, there can
be no ‘wish list’ without first compiling and developing
a ‘shift list’ of feasible options for disinvestment. At the
very least, this would result in a shorter and cheaper
process in the event that the barriers to disinvestment
cannot be overcome; with no need to progress to a
‘wish list’ unless feasible options for disinvestment have
first been identified and developed.
It may also be possible to provide incentives for rea-
lisation of resource release from disinvestment options
(rather than merely for their identification and develop-
ment). Others have made the general observation that
“organisations need to agree, in principle, the ground
rules for redeploying any savings made at the outset of
the exercise” [26]. Mitton et al [21] suggest the general
principle that only those budget areas that contributed
options to the ‘shift list’ should subsequently be consid-
ered for re-investment of released resources. More spe-
cific guarantees might, however, be desirable given the
barriers to disinvestment. For example, “financial incen-
tives, whereby clinicians are empowered to reinvest a
portion of resources released back into their services,
have been shown to encourage participation” [17].
Smith et al argue along similar lines that “program man-
agers want the ability to pair investment and disinvest-
ment proposals - ‘if we cut X, we can do Y’ - and so
retain any freed-up resources within their own program”
[20]. Where released resources are required to meet
budget deficits, guarantees might specify a minimum
share of resources released from each budget area that
would be available for re-deployment to safe, effective
and cost-effective services within that budget area (or
held over until safe, effective and cost-effective options
for investment within that budget area can be identi-
fied). This type of specific guarantee has the additional
advantage of consistency with recommendations made
regarding the scope of the programme budget. In reor-
ienting PBMA towards disinvestment, development of a
‘shift list’ of feasible options for disinvestment should
precede any consideration of a ‘wish list’. Investment
proposals should be linked to disinvestment proposals
within a relatively narrow budget area.
Summary
At both macro and micro levels, fund-holders operating
within environments of greater budgetary discipline
have emphasised the need for the development and
urgent application of mechanisms for disinvestment and
redeployment of resources from currently funded inter-
ventions [1-3,11,12]. In response to this need, processes
and tools for the identification, prioritisation and imple-
mentation of disinvestments have recently been devel-
oped and are now being utilised by health technology
assessment agencies around the world [4-8]. Few of
these processes explicitly “link questions about invest-
ment and disinvestment of services” [20]. Notable
exceptions include recent calls to consider disinvestment
of existing practice comparators whenever a replace-
ment is approved for funding [6]. Where disinvestment
processes operate independently or parallel to commis-
sioning, there is a risk that commissioning activities will
continue as if programme budgets can simply expand to
accommodate demand. While PBMA is often claimed to
“necessarily link questions about investment and disin-
vestment of services” [20], its variable performance in
achieving meaningful resource release suggests the need
for development of new mechanisms and/or modifica-
tions of the PBMA process to strengthen this link.
The discussion presented here has focused on re-
orienting PBMA towards disinvestment and resource
release. This attempt at distilling those aspects of PBMA
likely to minimise barriers to disinvestment has drawn
on the experience of many of the leading lights in the
development and application of PBMA. The reoriented
model is differentiated by the following features: (i) hard
budget constraint together with budgetary pressure; (ii)
Mortimer BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:288
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/10/288
Page 8 of 10
programme budgets with broad scope but specific
investment proposals linked to disinvestment proposals
with similar input requirements; (iii) advisory/working
groups that include equal representation of sectional
interests plus additional members with responsibility for
advocating in favour of disinvestment, (iv) ‘shift lists’
populated and developed prior to ‘wish lists’ and invest-
ment proposals linked to disinvestment proposals within
a relatively narrow budget area.
Planning is underway to trial the re-oriented PBMA
model in a Melbourne metropolitan hospital network as
part of a series of projects to demonstrate alternative
approaches to achieving resource release and disinvest-
ment. It is possible that the re-oriented model sacrifices
feasibility and acceptability (among clinicians and service
managers) to obtain its hypothesised greater emphasis
on resource release and disinvestment. This will be
explicitly tested in the planned demonstration. In the
meantime, debate around the re-oriented model pro-
posed here may yield further refinements. More gener-
ally, this author would urge academics and policy
analysts to contribute to the development of disinvest-
ment policy and practice. The gradual move over the
past 40 years to rational, evidence-based mechanisms
for prioritizing over new drugs and devices occurred
through the combined efforts of academics, analysts and
policy-makers. There is a danger that political consid-
erations will dominate disinvestment policy unless a
similar effort is made now.
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